Suffering, individual liberty and collective freedom: interpreting self-immolation as resistance and liberatory praxis through a Buddhist-Marxist lens

Essay submitted in response to the following topic:

Critically discuss Berlin’s critique of Marxism as restricting the liberty of the individual.

POL5048S Global Political Thought, Political Studies Department, University of Cape Town

“Through an additional act of boldness, it [Buddhism] reduces the metaphysical problem to one of human behaviour – a distinction it shares only with Marxism. Its schism occurred on the sociological level, the fundamental difference between the Great and Little Ways being the question of whether the salvation of a single individual depends, or does not depend, on the salvation of humanity as a whole. Between the Marxist critique, which frees man from his initial bondage – by teaching him that the apparent meaning of his condition evaporates as soon as he agrees to see things in a wider context – and the Buddhist critique which completes his liberation, there is neither opposition nor contradiction. Each is doing the same thing as the other, but on a different level.”

Claude Levi-Strauss (1955). Tristes Tropiques, p. 411-412. (Italics added, my emphasis).

Abstract

It is apt to use Buddhism as a philosophical entryway to critique Berlin’s framing of positive freedom. The bulk of his argument against it, is built around the metaphor of the higher/lower self: ideas of self-realisation, self-actualisation and self-mastery dominantly associated with Eastern philosophy, and expressed as self-determination in the Western tradition. This idea of self-mastery is specifically referenced and identified with/to Buddhism by Berlin in Four Essays on Liberty where he outlines his Two Concepts of Liberty. In this essay I look at the recent history of self-immolation in Tunisia and Algeria. 2010-2011 saw forms of political protest where people set themselves on fire, sparking what is now known as the Arab spring. I use the self-immolation of Mohamed Aouichia and Mohamed Bouazizi to illustrate the deficiency in Berlin’s conception of positive freedom. I aim to illustrate how acts of individual self-sacrifice can in turn achieve greater collective freedom, and even, individual liberty for the person involved. To that effect, the essay draws from both Buddhist and Marxist perspectives to support this proposition.

Introduction

Background and contextual location

In January 2011, 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself alight after failed repeated attempts to have his name on the social housing list in Algeria. He had been sharing a single room with seven other people. Just a few weeks before[1], there was a suicide by self-immolation[2] – setting oneself ablaze – of a Tunisian unemployed street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi[3] protesting the confiscation of his trading stock (Nti, 2013: 79; Badiou, 2012: 108). These acts of what we might call sacrificial protest, sparked widespread anger in North Africa – Algeria, Libya, Tunisia – spreading outbound in the middle east to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They coalesced in what came to be known as the Arab Spring – a series of uprisings and riots against regimes regarded as oppressive; authoritarian and undemocratic (Daniel, 2016; Badiou, 2012; Pugliese, 2014). Isaiah Berlin argues that a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed – freedom – however great the moral outcomes of that sacrifice (Berlin, 1979: 125). Reading this from an African and even South African context, I immediately recalled the countless deaths during the liberation struggle, sacrifices of individuals assassinated and imprisoned in the name of freedom[4]. I wondered what one might say, for example, of the sacrifices of the daring class of 1976, children as young as 11, mowed down by the apartheid regime. Did those sacrifices not result in an increase of freedom? Do those deaths count as sacrifices? Perhaps the preceding question would be to ask what is meant by sacrifice. And the implications of deliberate or inadvertent sacrifice.

Nonetheless, we might say that there has been improvement: less discrimination, moderate gains in reducing injustice. However, a strict reading of Berlin would say that these lives lost – though compensated for by some gains in justice or lessoned oppression today; if that did not lead to a material increase in the liberty of others, then an absolute loss of liberty has occurred[5]. It would be a “confusion of values” to say that though personal individual freedom is lost, some other kind of freedom “social, or economic – is increased” (Berlin, 1979: 126). Therefore, the question which would arise is: have we seen increases in liberty or freedom materially? Current African historiography presents conflicting answers to the question[6]. Most readily agree that there have been material changes and improvements. Yet, there remains a powerful rhetoric arguing that the negotiated settlements characterised by flag independence, neo-colonialism and neoliberalism have failed to fundamentally confront the causes of oppression (Saul, 2011), meaning that nothing has changed[7].

Aims and outline

It is not my intention to join the debate arising from the above reading of Berlin’s understanding of liberty. Instead, I use the recent deliberate acts of protest as seen through the self-immolation of Aouichia and Bouazizi to illustrate the deficiency in Berlin’s conception of positive freedom. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate the weakness of the individualism evident in negative freedom as contrasted by actions geared towards collective freedom and an embrace of Ubuntu (Ramose, 1999). To that effect, I draw on Buddhist and Marxist intellectual traditions (Struhl, 2017; Lévi-Strauss, 1973; Strenski, 1980; Nichols, 1995).

Universalised individualism and particularised collective freedom

Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty is marked by an almost endearing, well-meaning and good-natured sentiment. This is a remarkable disposition when one considers the provocative conclusion he reaches. I think this is partly because there is, presumably, a shared basis in the understanding of what is “the central question of politics”: the question of obedience and coercion (Berlin, 1979: 121).  Whilst debatable, there remains much to be critically appraised. However, I depart from the highly individualised philosophical entryway Berlin takes in his conception of liberty or freedom which disregards conceptions of collective freedom or Ubuntu (Ramose, 1999). This is important to note as a departing point. In his conception of negative freedom – an understanding of liberty which ultimately asserts non-interference as the highest form of freedom – Berlin (1979: 123) assigns a universal status to this conception despite its particular theoretical origin. He notes that the conception of liberty which he terms negative freedom draws from the meaning of the classical English political philosophers (Berlin, 1979: 123). The leap between what “they” – libertarians such as Locke and Mill in England, and Constant and Tocqueville in France – perceived, and the application in the context of third world liberation struggle against colonialism, attaining universal status, is unclear. Yet, when it comes to positive freedom, Berlin retains the particularity of that Eastern philosophical theoretical tradition[8].

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Berlin does not trouble explaining why there can be a separation between “individual liberty” and “some other kinds of freedom – social or economic” (Berlin, 1979: 125). Later in his conception of positive freedom – what one can be free to be (Berlin, 1979: 130), he does not explain what the distinction is, between the desire to govern oneself or participate in the process of such governing, and the desire to act freely without intervention in the sense of negative freedom (Berlin, 1979: 131), and only asserts that the two are not the same thing. The connection between individual liberty and democracy for those living under oppressive systems of white supremacy, capitalism, slavery or colonialism, is historically entwined (Fanon, 2017; Du Bois, 1966; James, 2001).  

Reconceptualising positive freedom

It is true that ideas of self-mastery, self-realisation and self-determination are largely derived from Eastern philosophy (Lévi-Strauss, 1973: 412). Though the equivalent ideas exist in the stoicism of the Greek ancient philosophy, notably as expressed by governor Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations, or as Berlin also cites, in the work of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, he opts to only isolate this metaphor of the higher-lower self to and with Buddhism. Considering that Hinduism and Buddhist thought predate ancient Greek/Western philosophy, that may be well. However, the fact that he ignores the foundational premises of this thought whilst appropriating the metaphors to mobilise a convenient attack of the idea of positive freedom tied to Marxism, is not only uncharitable, but might even be considered racist, because he could have drawn on a Western philosophical tradition to attack such a conception of liberty. This is more concerning as it relates to the question of liberty; in Buddhist thought – or at least a reading of it[9], life itself, existence, is the basis of suffering, and by extension, what one seeks to be free from (Struhl, 2017). This is the fundamental difference absent in Berlin’s conception: he uses the self-mastery metaphor as a critique of freedom from desires or base nature. In the Buddhist conception, this is marshalled for freedom from the cycle of suffering. Therefore, a more complete reading of the metaphor with respect to liberty, would lead one to assess acts of sacrifice in a different light in contradistinction to Berlin’s understanding of individual liberty.

More than that, on a collective level, Berlin’s analysis of Buddhism is distorted, suggesting that it reduces human beings to “natural objects, played on by causal influences, creatures at the mercy of external stimuli” (Berlin, 1979: 136). At this point I seek to draw the connective between Buddhist metaphysics and the materialist socio-economic framework of Marxism, which both posit the human to be a subject made of a set of intertwined relations[10]. Unlike Berlin would have it, the effect is not to reduce humans to objects. Rather it positions them in a symbiotic relationship with the “natural world” consistent with a philosophical reading of mutual recognition (Ramose, 1999).

By fire: Buddhist and Marxist sympathies on the nature of suffering and liberation

In Marxist terms, capitalism creates suffering[11]. The homelessness of Mohamed Aouichia and the fact that Mohamed Bouazizi was unemployed are factors which led both to engage in an extreme form of protest where they set themselves on fire (Badiou, 2012). In the materialist framework of Marxism, this can be partly attributed to an economic mode of production where many are exploited for their labour power – the surplus of which goes to a few individuals who own the means of production (Gray, 1986). Concentration of wealth, inequality and the failure to redistribute resources equitably produces misery and suffering; poverty, homelessness, alienation and unemployment among them (Shields, 2013). In the last half-century, self-immolation has increasingly become a form of political protest, however, it has a long history in Eastern philosophical traditions associated with Hinduism and Buddhism[12]. Liberation is the goal of the Buddhist philosophical tradition. In reaching this end, Buddhist ethics emphasises what we might call a philosophy of Ubuntu[13] as expressed through the Noble Eight-Fold Path[14], whilst Marxism espouses class struggle. Both converge on a recognition of collective set of reproduced relations beyond individual interests (Shields, 2013).

It remains contested that Aouichia and Bouazizi were acting beyond their own individual interests. But it is undeniable that they reflected wider dissatisfaction and resentment as evidenced in the widespread resonance of their actions. Self-immolation is not necessarily within the sanctioned tools of Marxist struggle per se; yet, Marxism has not always had a smooth conjoining with revolutionary moments in the global south, as the scripts and grammar of liberatory praxis has not always coincided with the Western critical tradition (de Sousa Santos, 2014). The fact that methods might differ is not necessarily sufficient to not appraise the outcome sparked by the actions of those whose lives were cut short with much ahead of them. In their death; though arguably fatalistic; much can be learnt about how to live with dignity on one’s own terms, meaningfully; and by extension, about how to die.

Contrary to what Berlin would have us believe, it is not this form of freedom characterised by self-determination which has the danger of unleashing the “greatest despotism imaginable” (Berlin, 1979: 137). For in Berlin’s eyes every tyrant or despot seems like the caricatured African or Asian dictator. We, however, know that historically, those that have treated people as if they were not free but as “human material for the benevolent reformer”, have done so in the name of individual liberty advancing civilisation, reason and rationality. This paternalism was evident at the height of slavery and colonialism and to deny this as part of the history of modernity would in Berlin’s words be “distorted historical materialism”.

References

Badiou A. (2012) The rebirth of history, London: Verso.

Berlin I. (1979) Four essays on liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Daniel JR. (2016) The Event That We Are: Ontology, Rhetorical Agency, and Alain Badiou. Philosophy And Rhetoric 49: 254-276.

de Sousa Santos B. (2014) Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide, 2014: Paradigm Publishers.

Du Bois WEB. (1966) Black Reconstruction in America: An essay toward a history of the part which black folk played in the attempt to reconstruct democracy in America, 1850-1880, New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

Fanon F. (2017) The wretched of the earth, Cape Town: Kwela Books.

Gray J. (1986) Marxian freedom, individual liberty, and the end of alienation. Social Philosophy & Policy 3: 160-187.

James CLR. (2001) The black Jacobins : Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo revolution, London: Penguin.

Lévi-Strauss C. (1973) Tristes tropiques, London: Jonathan Cape.

Nichols B. (1995) The Buddhism of Claude Levi-Strauss. The Centennial Review 39: 109-128.

Nti NB. (2013) Lessons from the death of a Tunisian salesman: A commentary. African Security Review 22: 78-84.

Pugliese J. (2014) Permanent Revolution: Mohamed Bouazizi’s Incendiary Ethics of Revolt. Law, Culture and the Humanities 10: 408-420.

Ramose MB. (1999) African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books Publishers.

Saul J. (2011) Tanzania Fifty Years on (1961-2011): Rethinking Ujamaa, Nyerere and Socialism in Africa. A Flawed Freedom: Rethinking Southern African Liberation. Cape Town: UCT Press, 29-45.

Shields J. (2013) Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhist Materialism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics: 461-499.

Strenski IJ. (1980) Lévi-Strauss and the buddhists. Comparative Studies in Society and History 22: 3-22.

Struhl K. (2017) Buddhism and Marxism: points of intersection. International Communication of Chinese Culture 4: 103-116.

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[1] See Alain Badiou (2010) Appendix 1: Tunisia and Egypt in The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings noting “everything began” with Bouazizi’s self-immolation, largely accredited as the father of the Arab Spring.

[2] The etymology of the word immolation evokes imagery of burning as a method of sacrifice.

[3] Joseph Pugliese (2014) in Permanent Revolution describes Mohamed Bouazizi’s “incendiary ethics of revolt”

[4] Examples are abound: from Steven Bantu Biko to Thomas Sankara, Patrice Lumumba, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe either killed or incarcerated in defence of ideals tied to liberty, freedom and justice.

[5] Berlin (1979:125) says: everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice.

[6] Lee Wengraf (2018) in Extracting Profit provides a bleak painting of contemporary Africa drawing from the Marxist tradition and using Rodney’s 1972 classing How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.

[7] Fanon’s final chapter of The wretched of the earth and Nkrumah Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.

[8] Lévi-Strauss (1973:412) in Tristes Tropiques notes that there has been an “unbroken movement of thought going from East to West, and then from West to East – perhaps for no other reason than to confirm its origin”.

[9] See the online archive of the Dīghanikāya, Buddhist Sutta and discourse https://suttacentral.net/dn

[10] See Kreutz (2017) https://aeon.co/essays/how-marxism-and-buddhism-complement-each-other

[11] See chapter 31 “The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist”, pp 914-26 in Karl Marx’s Capital, volume 1.

[12] See Shields (2013) on page 476 Liberation as Revolutionary Praxis: Rethinking Buddhist Materialism.

[13] The path to ‘enlightenment’ is undertaken with the goal of ending the suffering of all sentient beings.

[14] The eightfold path consists of eight practices: right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. This clearly illustrates that individual liberation is not isolated from a larger societal backdrop; in fact it is the opposite.